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Nietzsche and Heraclitus:  
Notes on Stars without an Atmosphere 
Niketas Siniossoglou 
 
 
[The following was written in the summer of 2015 in a country oscillating between socio-
economic disaster and a descent into a state of perpetual incomplete nihilism.  The latter 
prevailed.]   
 
 
Nietzschean dream 
I awake estranged from everyone. Words have lost their meaning; they sound 
indifferent and homonymous. The word No appears to mean Yes, or rather: Yes and No 
are malleable, ephemeral, and transparent. A decades-old or perhaps centuries-old 
movement of miry clay has resulted in a miscarriage of words. I  inquire whether 
anyone still holds the resources needed for a direct, sincere affirmation of life—a Yes 
that is definitively and essentially affirmative—or a No that is definitively and 
essentially negative—words bursting forth splendour like a crystal. I am told that 
formulations of this sort are incomprehensible; they are too metaphorical and, in the 
end, nonsensical, at least according to the elenctic criteria of analytical philosophy and 
common sense. 
I am left hanging—speechless and astonished at the same time—as noon rapidly 
approaches. I have no idea where to turn. This is what some ancients might call 
ἐνεοστασία: standing numb. As I see it, I have nowhere to set my foot either: a giant 
oilcloth of patterned catch-phrases and signs is stretched as far as my eye can see. This 
verbal carpet is thin, vile, and milky; its plasticity, indeed, impressive! I lift up one edge 
and take a peek underneath. I can see an increased share of communal wretchedness 
breathing deeply, a huge growth of ugliness, petit-bourgeois bragging and lying 
perpetuated in an anodyne way—as if it were the most natural thing in the world: who 
knows whence it came and how old it is. An insatiable State watches over this neoplasm 
and feeds it; in return for its opportune vigilance, the State is itself magnified. It occurs 
to me that occasionally the beast and its food coincide. 
 Now I am surrounded by exhortations, words of consolation and apologies swiftly 
carried around me. I suspect an outbreak of and mass addiction to moraline. For 
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example, the alibi of ‘social and democratic sensitivity,’ or of ‘social justice’ ostensibly 
re-baptize whomever boastfully claims them into morally superior beings. These are 
creditable expressions, you see, and carry such a good name! Pretexts employing such a 
popular vocabulary are conveniently idolized—they are elevated into pseudo-gods. This 
is how immorality is turned into institutionalized morality. For example, when one 
serves the interests of a rotten priesthood yet manages to persuade everyone else that 
he is serving those of the people! What a fraud! 
As the day goes by, the converts to the trickster’s use of words (‘political,’ some call 
it) are ever growing in numbers and strength. They even try to persuade me that their 
handling of words has a soothing and stress-relieving effect. Their point is that 
communal participation in a pseudonymous morality washes off the loneliness of 
excellence. Here you have the benefits of our conceptual Babylon! Resentful and 
fatigued, I realize that I am far from becoming who I am. I can barely take one step, and 
I immediately sense the weight of my body as impossible to bear. Apparently this state 
of continuing clash with others and protracted opposition to their ideas and language 
causes weariness and acedia. I need to distance myself in order to get a grip. 
I imagine Nietzsche having had my dream; possibly around 1883, at the time he 
was working on Thus Spoke Zarathustra, nauseated by the linguistic confusion 
(Sprachverwirrung) affecting the very understanding of good and evil (KSA 4.62.1) and 
disgusted by the proliferation of “pretty words” (KSA 4. 77.2: schöne Worte), which he 
would later call “beautiful, twinkling, tinkling, festive words” (KSA 5.230.9).1 As early as 
1872/3 he was at a loss over “the philosopher caught in the nets of language” (KSA 
7.463.5: Der Philosoph in den Netzen der Sprache angefangen), and by 1874 he was 
studying the malady of words (KSA 1.329: die Krankheit der Worte) in his second Untimely 
Meditation, possessing abundant evidence on the abuse of moraline, that substance 
responsible for the alternation of resentment and hypocrisy by means of discourse. 
Nietzsche could hardly find refuge in academia, let alone contemporary politics: both 
were controlled by the powerful clan of the “Albinos of concepts” (KSA 6.184: die 
Begriffs-Albinos), who were responsible for the procreation of “conceptual dragons” 
(KSA 1.329: Begriffs-Drachen) and pseudo- philosophies. Even dear friend Wagner was 
eventually shown to be but an idol among others. Nietzsche was cornered—to all 
appearances he was disillusioned with academic scholarship and the people; in reality, 
things were far worse: he was disillusioned with the application of language and being-
in-history as such. 
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Upon closer scrutiny though, Nietzsche was far from alone. His texts form a system 
of signals devised to attract like-minded people in the future, as well as align his own 
self within a constellation of philosophers and wise men from the past. It is the latter 
who first experienced a type of ancient loneliness (Einsamkeit), reflected and kindled in 
Nietzsche’s modern loneliness. Its main bearer is Heraclitus, that “star without 
atmosphere,” as Nietzsche already calls him  in Über das Pathos der Wahrheit (1872), a 
short “introduction to an unwritten book” devoted to Cosima Wagner (KSA 1.755-760). 
The essay transmits tenets of a purely Heraclitean worldview and conveys a clear 
message: there is a way to cause ruptures in one's being-in-history and open up to what 
lies well beyond our purely historical manner of being. Heraclitus is hailed as the first 
to have provided the proper remedial formula. He stands for those “rare moments” that 
“instantaneously illuminate everything” (plötzliche Erleuchtungen), those instances, I 
believe, that very much resemble what Plato had in mind with his notorious ἐξαίφνης 
and Nietzsche/Zarathustra with his Augenblick. These instantaneous moments allow 
the individual to enter the constellation of certain men who “live in a solar system of 
their own,” men whom it “is crucial to know … have existed” (KSA 1.757.3; 758.3): they 
are “stars without an atmosphere” (KSA 1.758.14-15), and it is their company that 
might allow me to re-claim a mode of being that is normally deemed long-lost and 
unreachable: for both the State as well as contemporary communities have irreversibly 
moved in a very different direction. 
Georges Battaille wrote that Heraclitus was revealed to Nietzsche as his double, “a 
being of which Nietzsche was not but a shadow.”2 Bataille might have had in mind 
Nietzsche’s own statement in Ecce Homo: “I generally feel warmer and in better spirits 
in his [Heraclitus’s] company than anywhere else.” Heraclitus appealed to Nietzsche 
owing to their shared affiliation to an underlying common worldview, the elements of 
which I present in what follows. At the outset though, it is equally significant that both 
Nietzsche and Heraclitus philosophize with metaphors. The contrast between 
metaphorical discourse, on the one hand, and syllogistic or apodeictic discourse, on the 
other, wrote Sarah Kofman, reflects that between two different types of philosopher: 
the Heraclitean versus the Aristotelian philosopher, one that may also be presented as 
the opposition between two archetypal figures: Dionysus and Socrates. Nietzsche’s 
falling back on Heraclitean metaphor is a conscious move in the hope of re-investing 
language with a presumably lost ability for greater precision, simplicity, and directness. 
In more technical terms, the underlying premise authorizing Nietzsche’s move stems 
from his radical reversal of a key Aristotelean proposition that is, as it happens, the 
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hallmark of Western philosophy: Aristotle thought that metaphors refer to concepts, 
which means that concepts come before metaphors. Contrariwise, Nietzsche posited 
that concepts refer to metaphors, rather than the other way around—which means that 
a metaphorically captured truth is communicable more fully and with greater success 
than one analyzed by means of Aristotle’s Organon.3 Kofman's reading may be further 
strengthened by Nietzsche’s own statement in the Notebooks: “it is not the pure drive for 
knowledge that decides, but the aesthetic drive: the poorly supported philosophy of 
Heraclitus has greater artistic value than all the propositions of Aristotle” (KSA 
7.444.23-26). This note originated in the summer of 1872, that is, almost 
contemporaneously with On the Pathos of Truth, and testifies to a conscious conversion 
to Heraclitean expression. To philosophize, then, requires a type of discourse that, as 
the Delphic maxim goes and Heraclitus repeats, οὔτε λέγει οὔτε κρύπτει, ἀλλὰ σημαίνει 
(DK 22Β93). Nietzsche makes a note of this Delphic/Heraclitean maxim and appears 
perplexed by its meaning in On the Passion for Truth (KSA 1.759.6) as well as in the 
Untimely Meditations (KSA 1.333.1-5). Where does such an oracular and Heraclitean 
logos point to, he asks, what does it really reveal, and where does it lead us? The only 
way to find out is to philosophize metaphorically—just as Heraclitus did. 
 
Of Old and New Ephesians 
Beyond the common preference for metaphor extend particular eclectic affinities 
between Nietzsche and Heraclitus. To begin with, both are philosophers of the single 
human being and individual existence. In a provocatively anti-Aristotelian manner they 
advocate a radical intellectual aristocratism that is profoundly anti-political: man in 
his core is more than ‘a political animal’ and exercises the right to withdraw from the 
polis (KSA 6.106.12-21: “what is great in civilisation was a-political, in fact anti-
political”). The more communities fail, the more imperative it becomes to turn inward 
and cease training one’s voice for the sake of sounding like others. In the past this 
outlook sheltered many who suspected that mediocrity and hypocrisy are not 
contingent political phenomena, but a natural disposition of human communities. The 
majority naturally tends to baptize as rational what is merely useful and serves its 
interests at any one point—here is an idea that deeply perplexed Thucydides as well 
Nietzsche. Necessarily, then, nothing shared in common is really rare; nothing ordinary 
and mediocre (mittelmässig) is really fascinating; and nothing appropriate to a herd can 
ennoble the soul of the individual. As Nietzsche puts it: “none of the great Greek 
philosophers carries the people with him”—and Heraclitus, the philosopher who 
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“rejects the people from the outset,” serves as the example par excellence (KSA 7.544.1-
14).  
Nietzsche and Heraclitus do not recommend yet another experimentation with 
public discourse; rather, a self-reflective, interior conversation with oneself. It is thus 
that highly metaphorical and demanding tropes are substituted for the indolent talk of 
Old and New Ephesians. The shift inward concerns form as well as content.  In place of 
the hypocritical concern for others and “pretty words” (schöne Worte), Nietzsche and 
Heraclitus recommend my sincere relation to my own self:  
 
You crowd around your neighbor and you have pretty words for it. But I say to you: your 
love of the neighbor is your bad love of yourselves. (KSA 4.77.2-4) 
 
Take, for example, a bunch of pretty words reiterated ad nauseam these days: at these 
times of crisis ‘intellectuals,’ ‘men of letters,’ and ‘artists’ should ‘stand up,’ ‘speak up,’ 
and ‘assume their responsibilities as members of society.’ More often than not, the 
public announcement of such anodyne clichés does not serve the community, but rather 
the narcissism and self-aggrandizement of ambitious professionals. These are the 
retailers of ‘the crisis’ that they ostensibly condemn in shock and awe: the merchants of 
the modern crisis. This triggers Nietzsche’s disgust (in the third Untimely Meditation) 
with the lobbying intelligentsia and pseudo-philosophical columnists who consistently 
degrade philosophy into journalism. Do not sell off your ‘art’ and ‘thought’ to the herd, 
he urges, for thus you perpetuate the desolation of philosophy and art. In the same 
vein, Nietzsche repudiates the Viertelsphilosphen of today, the “Quadrant-philosophers” 
or “quarter philosophers” (KSA 1.357.3-11). These are the organic intellectuals (to apply 
here a Gramscian expression), who appear to speak seriously when in reality are totally 
incapacitated from fighting against the malady of History, for they are the actual 
carriers of that malady. Quarter-philosophers devour each other “and cannot even 
digest themselves” (KSA 4.63.4-5), that is, they are appropriating to their own causes 
culture, politics, in the end language. What vulgarity and insatiability! 
Nietzsche calls the whole lot of this opportune and instrumental application of 
language and thinking Afterphilosophie: possible translations are backside philosophy 
and bastard philosophy—the term signifies second-class or low philosophy, yet its real 
associations are less academically correct: a more apt rendering is anal philosophy (from 
German After-: anus). 4  Nietzsche attacks the prevailing, current, and dominant 
intelligentsia as an Afterphilosophie “recognised by the State”: 
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Every philosophy which believes that the problem of being in the world (das Problem des 
Daseins) is touched on, let alone solved, by a political event is a joke- and After-
philosophie. (KSA 1.365.7-9, 421.23-31) 
 
Quarter-philosophers excel in taming and eventually ridiculing philosophy because 
they use philosophy professionally—that is, in order to climb up the ladder. 
Contrariwise, members of the constellation of “stars with no atmosphere” regard the 
experience of truth as a raw, violent, and terrible experience. Arthur Schopenhauer 
serves as such a counter-example (KSA 2.427.14-15) against the current of die Hegelei, a 
man who conformed to some of the genuine presuppositions of philosophy: 
 
These, then, are some of the conditions under which the philosophical genius can at any 
rate come into existence in our time despite the forces working against it: free 
manliness of character, early knowledge of mankind, no scholarly education, no narrow 
patriotism, no necessity for bread-winning, no ties with the state—in short, freedom and 
again freedom: that wonderful and perilous element in which the Greek philosophers 
were able to grow up. (KSA 1.411-19-27) 
 
In “The Grand Inquisitor,” Dostoevsky has the ephemeral representatives of the Church 
sending Christ away: for there is no need for Christ now that they are in charge. In a 
similar manner, Nietzsche has the Quarter-philosophers experience no need 
whatsoever for the return of genuine philosophy. Besides, the State and its intellectuals 
are merely continuing from where the Church with its theologians stopped. 
The function of the fierce and inflammatory tone of Nietzsche’s attacks on the 
academic, clerical, and socio-political establishment cannot be adequately dealt with 
here. What matters is that the preference for these means of expression forms an 
integral part of his claiming an epochê, that is, an exemption from to-day. This radical 
mode of thinking and writing presupposes the passage from the language of the State 
to that of the individual human being, as well as the passage from one’s neighbor to 
one’s self, from what is outside to what is inside, from hypocritical political engagement 
to a sincere self-distancing from the polis. In a nutshell, radical aristocratism transfers 
back to the individual all that was so conveniently passed over to State and Church: 
responsibility for one’s self.  
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ἐδιζησάμην ἐμεωυτόν 
How am I to assume this responsibility if forgetful of my own self? We are always only in 
our own company, says Nietzsche in the Gay Science (KSA 3.498.25-8: wir sind stets nur in 
unserer Gesellschaft). My self is the actual front rank from which I move on, rather than 
any political party, community, or group. Nietzsche opts for the German word 
Selbstsucht: not really selfishness, but rather self-regard and immersion into one's self. 
Selbstsucht recalls Selbstsuche, the search for the self: ἐδιζησάμην ἐμευωτόν (I inquired of 
myself) is the guiding maxim of Heraclitus (DK 22B101), one that Nietzsche considers in 
On the Pathos of Truth as slandered and misused for centuries. The Christian is ever 
vigilant against his own selfishness; the socialist is ever vigilant against the selfishness 
of others. In both cases the love for one's self is demonized. By contrast, Nietzsche 
retrieves for self-love precisely the good that the early Christians projected on to love 
for one's neighbor: the way to break existing political communities asunder and break 
through the limits of a crooked self.  
In Heraclitus, then, Nietzsche traces the archetypal version of such a self-regard 
(Eigenliebe) that is a love for truth (KSA 1.759.17: Liebe zur Wahrheit). Self-regard 
provides the impetus for arriving at an inalienable core that I must constantly observe 
and keep safe in order not to lose myself: “I will remain my own” (Ich will mein bleiben!) 
is the conclusion, says Nietzsche, commenting on Schopenhauer's dreadful endeavor of 
self-inspection, one that calls for descending into the depths of Being-in-this-world 
(KSA 1.374.5-8: in die Tiefe des Daseins hinabtauchen). 
There is only one way to remain my own, and this is to become who I am. Γέννοιο οἷος 
ἐσσὶ μαθών, as Pindar put it (III.72), a motto that Nietzsche transcribes as be who you 
are in Thus Spoke Zarathustra and in Gay Science (KSA 4.297.17: Werde, der du bist!), and 
eventually chooses as the motto of Ecce Homo (KSA 6.255: How one becomes who he is 
[Wie man wird, was man ist]).5 The meaning is twofold. First, that the way forward is a 
progression inward; and second, that the sustainment of the self while being within 
history (what Plato might call σωτηρία—the Greek idea of salvation as resilience) 
amounts to a state of alertness and movement. Nietzsche and Heraclitus are the 
philosophers of power and becoming: nothing ever is for everything resides in a state of 
perpetual becoming, according to the summary of that ancient worldview that Socrates 
presents in Plato's Theaetetus (152d: ἔστι μὲν γὰρ οὐδέποτ' οὐδέν, ἀεὶ δὲ γίγνεται). Plato 
credits this outlook to a whole series of wise men from Homer to his own time, as if this 
were the genuine ancient Greek worldview. Socrates' ironic reconstruction of what his 
predecessors believed appears to have thus anticipated Nietzsche’s view on the birth of 
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Hellenic thought, most famously presented in his nostalgia for the Dionysian and 
Heraclitean sixth century BC in the Birth of Tragedy (KSA 1.14-30). Homer, notes 
Socrates in the Theaetetus, makes Ocean and Tethys the begetters of gods. Flux is 
inscribed in the mythical origins of the universe. Nietzsche-cum-Heraclitus descends 
into, or rather returns to, these origins without any hint of Socratic irony: 
 
To affirm the passing away and destruction that is crucial for a Dionysian philosophy, 
saying yes to opposition and war, ‘becoming’ along with a radical rejection of the very 
concept of ‘being’—all this is more closely related to me than anything else people have 
thought so far. The doctrine of the ‘eternal return,’ which is to say the unconditional 
infinitely repeated cycle of all things—this is Zarathustra’s doctrine, but ultimately it is 
nothing Heraclitus couldn't have said too. (KSA 6.313.2-12)  
 
Yet Nietzsche knows that it is impossible to enter twice the river of the history of 
philosophy. The first tragic philosopher could not be any other than him: 
Nietzsche/Zarathustra. Nowhere does this claim to novelty emerge more clearly than in 
Section 8 of the ‘Old and New Tablets’ in Thus Spoke Zarathustra. There, the concept of 
Heraclitean flux is no longer restricted to its original context of pre-Platonic 
hylozoism; rather, it is extended to cover the moral and political circumstance of 
modern masses. Nietzsche’s re-politicizing of Heraclitus’s theory of flux deserves to be 
quoted at length: 
 
      If timbers span the water, if footbridges and railings leap over the river, then surely 
the one who says ‘Everything is in flux’ has no credibility. 
      Instead, even the dummies contradict him. “What?” say the dummies, “everything is 
supposed to be in flux? But the timbers and the railings are over the river! 
 Over the river everything is firm, all the values of things, the bridges, concepts, all 
‘good’ and ‘evil’—all this is firm!” 
 But when the hard winter comes, the beast-tamer of rivers, then even the wittiest 
learn to mistrust, and, sure enough, then not only the dummies say: “Should everything 
not—stand still?” 
 “Basically everything stands still”—that is a real winter doctrine, a good thing for 
sterile times, a good comfort for hibernators and stove huggers. 
 “Basically everything stands still”—but against this preaches the thaw wind! 
 The thaw wind, a bull that is no plowing bull—a raging bull, a destroyer that breaks 
ice with its wrathful horns! But ice—breaks footbridges! 
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 Yes my brothers, is everything not now in flux? Have all railings and footbridges not 
fallen into the water? Who could still hang on to ‘good’ and ‘evil’? 
 “Woe to us! Hail to us! The thaw wind is blowing!”—Preach me this, oh my brothers, 
in all the streets! 
(KSA 4.252.1-27) 
 
Everything always flows deep underground. It is only in the shared surface that I may 
allow myself to be fooled by things. For it is there that I am persuaded that those 
dominant and yet ephemeral concepts ostensibly tie communities together:  
 
Madness (Irrsinn) is rare in the individual—but with groups, parties, peoples, and ages, it 
is the rule. (KSA 5.100.9-10) 
 
How odd, then, are these masses and their political factions! How to explain that they 
are so easily deceived and yet hardly react? Nietzsche’s reply in On Truth and Error from 
an extra-moral sense (1873) is that in the end men are not really concerned that they are 
deceived or lied to; the only thing that really puts them in a state of genuine rage and 
fury is direct personal damage. To be sure, men are attracted to truth, just not enough—
they stop halfway to truth, just as they are encountering aspects of truth that are 
contingent and partial. These are ‘truths’ appropriate to selfish and interest-driven 
beings, as one may infer from an analysis of their usage of language (KSA 1.878.4-16). 
The masses have unlearned nostalgia. They know no more how to let themselves be 
driven by what lies before and under the lies of language. The upshot is, as one reads in 
Beyond Good and Evil, that “we are, from the bottom up and across the ages, used to 
lying” (KSA 5.114.6-7: Wir sind von Grund aus, von Alters her—an's Lüge gewöhnt). 
In Daybreak Nietzsche applies the neologism Schein-Egoismus to describe this 
collective mode of affirming a merely limited or partial truth, or even creating it, that 
is: pseudo-egoism. The outbreak of pseudo-egoism is made possible by appeals to a 
fictional ‘humanity’ that authorizes the cultivation and growth of a phantom of the true 
ego within individual minds. Nietzsche describes a spectral and merely conceptual 
humanity, a monstrous Abstractum that tacitly takes over and controls the life of the 
majority. Individual men and their communities are absorbed and accommodated 
within this spectral apparition until individual selfhood drains away. Beliefs and habits 
form a grotesque network: people, says Nietzsche,  
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dwell in a fog of impersonal, semi-personal opinions, and arbitrary, as it were poetical, 
evaluations, the one forever in the head of someone else, and the head of this someone 
else again in the heads of others: a strange world of phantasms. 
 
Collectively approved conceptualizations are substituted for variants of individual 
existence to the point of “all these people, unknown to themselves” sharing the 
experience of the same conceptual simulacrum.  It is now very hard for the individual 
(der Einzelne) to rise against this networked world and oppose “a genuine ego” capable 
of sabotaging the altogether fictional yet prevalent specter of pseudo-egoism. The 
reason is that “every alteration effected to this abstraction [of man] by the judgments of 
individual powerful figures (such as princes and philosophers) produces an 
extraordinary and grossly disproportionate effect on the great majority” (KSA 3.92.27-
93.19).  
With the individual unknowingly trapped in a simulated world, we should not, of 
course, expect the State to acknowledge any obligation to remind individuals of what 
was originally at stake. On the contrary, “the State never has any use for truth as such, 
but only for truth which is useful to the State, more precisely, for anything whatever 
that is useful to its interests whether it be truth, half-truth, or error” (KSA 1.422.17-19). 
The State resembles a water-mill that mechanically reduces and modifies the power of 
the water that moves it. In so doing, the State functions as a bulwark against any force 
threatening to advance beyond the meeting of its prosaic needs (KSA 1.389.1-9). It is 
thus that the individual is transformed from a bursting torrent to a quiet water-tank.  
Heraclitus denounced the πονηρὰν πολιτείαν (DK 22Α1) of the Ephesians and 
withdrew to the temple of Artemis, where he spent his time playing with children. 
Heraclitus, says Nietzsche in a crucial passage in the Genealogy of Morals (KSA 
5.353.15-31), sought thus to flee from what we too seek to flee today: the nonsense talk 
of Ephesians, their democracy, their political endeavors. Heraclitus became an 
anchorite. And we would do well to put ourselves too in the shoes of a modern 
Heraclitus: “Why are we lacking such temples?” That selfsame Heraclitean need for “a 
pause from today” persists. Like Heraclitus, we want to bring today to its end. Let it 
cease, Nietzsche demands, for it is in the face of to-day that we constantly defend 
ourselves, and are thus incapable of talking naturally, being, rather, obliged always to 
raise our voice in the hope of being heard:  
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That which Heraclitus avoided, however, is still the same as that which we shun today: 
the noise and democratic chatter of the Ephesians, their politics, their 1atest news of 
the ‘Empire’ (the Persian, you understand), their market business of ‘today’—for we 
philosophers need to be spared one thing above all: everything to do with ‘today.’ We 
reverence what is still, cold, noble, distant, past, and in general everything in the face of 
which the soul does not have to defend itself and wrap itself up—what one can speak to 
without speaking aloud. (KSA 5.353.30) 
 
Nietzsche found no new temple of Artemis, nor peace from the torrents of loud talk. 
The democratic chatter and market business of today proved unstoppable. Consolation 
and refuge are to be found in a different course of action. Nietzsche sees himself as 
digging tunnels in the linguistic constructions of the New Ephesians, hiding there and 
moving underground like the marmot, exercising himself in a type of linguistic 
disobedience (KSA 5.169.9-19). There are many words, he says in Beyond Good and Evil, 
words that make a nice noise and tinkle. These words provide the prime matter for 
exclamations that make one swell with pride: ‘love for truth,’ ‘sacrifice for knowledge,’ 
and so on. But we know in all the secrecy (in aller Heimlichkeit) “of a hermit's conscience 
that even this dignified verbal pageantry belongs among the false old finery, debris, and 
gold dust of human vanity.” The goal then is to move under this masquerade and 
painted surface, in order to bring to light the elementary text of homo natura, that is, to 
retrieve the texture of the natural condition of man: to translate man back to the 
language of nature (KSA 5.169.20).   
One year later, Nietzsche adds a prologue to the new edition of Daybreak (1887), in 
which he begins with more or less the selfsame metaphors and remarks. He sees himself 
as “a subterranean man at work”—Dostoyevsky’s anti-hero springs to mind—a man who 
opens up holes and tunnels like a lonely mole. He works surreptitiously in order to 
undermine, and knows how to find his way out of the political labyrinths of rhetoric 
and persuasion—this is a “hazardous enterprise” undertaken in solitude. Only he who 
has eyes for such work in the depths can see Nietzsche at work (KSA 3.11.1-19). 
Loneliness, strife, metaphor: these are the three main points of confluence between 
Nietzsche and Heraclitus authorizing versions of a solitary, quarrelsome, and yet 
dynamic attempt at shifting the ordinary nexus of social and eventually linguistic 
relations. 
Heraclitus and Nietzsche are fascinated by the overflow of becoming; yet they 
despair at the overflow of their own black bile. On the one hand, they are philosophers 
of strife in a world not made by any personal godhead (DK 22B30: οὔτε τις θεῶν οὔτε 
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ἀνθρώπων ἐποίησεν); on the other, their resilience is decreasing. Melancholy burdens 
both, even if Nietzsche left behind a voluminous body of works,  whereas Heraclitus, 
according to the testimony of Theophrastus, left some of his works unfinished, and 
wrote others in a non-systematic manner (DK 22A1), what we might call ‘untimely.’ 
Apparently, the co-existence with either Old or New Ephesians is barely bearable. 
Πολλοί κακοί, ολίγοι δὲ ἀγαθοί (DK 22Β104) says Heraclitus quoting Bias (“the many are 
base, while the few are noble”), and Nietzsche rebels against the Herdentier time and 
again.  
Both experience the de-sacralization of the world. Traditional mysteries, says 
Heraclitus, take place in an unholy way (DK 22Β14, ἀνιερωστί): “the mysteries 
traditionally practiced by men are celebrated in an unholy manner.” In  Zarathustra's 
version of this experience, “what was once called secret and secrecy of deep souls, today  
belongs to the street trumpeters and other butterflies” (KSA 4.233.19-21). Men do not 
know how to hear or talk, says Heraclitus (DK 22Β19: ἀκοῦσαι οὐκ ἐπιστάμενοι οὐδ’ 
εἰπεῖν), they are disconnected from the wisdom of the world. Zarathustra feels the 
same: “everyone talks among them”, and yet “everything is betrayed.” Men do not know 
how to talk authentically and listen any more, says Nietzsche in Ecce Homo, showing an 
eclectic kinship with Heraclitus’s solitude. Good ears are rare, ears well trained and 
capable of assimilating a philosophy that is unheard of (KSA 6.290.25, 304.19):  
 
the fact that people do not hear me these days, that they do not know how to accept 
anything I say, these facts are not only understandable, they even strike me as the way 
things should be. (KSA 6.298.13-16) 
 
There is a proliferation of empty talk that exhausts things: everything gets talked to 
death (KSA 4.233.16: Alles bei ihnen redet, alles wird zerredet). This rupture with the 
community goes as far as Heraclitean misanthropy (DK 22A1: καὶ τέλος 
μισανθρωπήσας). In Homer’s Wettkampf (KSA 1.782-792), yet another small prologue to 
a book that was never written, Nietzsche transmits Heraclitus’s notorious dictum: all 
adult Ephesians would do well to go and hang themselves and leave the city to the 
children, for they have exiled Hermodorus, who reached excellence (DK 22Β121). A few 
years later, Nietzsche/Zarathustra more or less prescribed the same remedy to the half-
dead New Ephesians around him (KSA 4.93-6). In the case of both Nietzsche and 
Heraclitus, misanthropy stems from a love for man and the original potential now lost. 
The more deeply a single human being (der Einzelne) achieves individuation by turning 
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against the community to the point of misanthropy, the more he exposes like a Satyr 
“the lying caricature of the ‘man of culture’” (KSA 1.58.20-28 and 59.1: Culturlüge), and 
hence the more productively he contributes to a civilization that is genuine and tragic 
(KSA 9.99.24-25), that is, a civilization that ceases to be led from the nose by the State. 
 
Ἀγχιβάται — those who come near  
Words work like water-clocks. Their meaning appears to us tired and exhausted within 
this or that historical context; yet once we dare turn upside down their habitual 
signification, words become again relatable and young. As it happens, in some cases 
this unabashed reversal ushers in words finally recollecting the original meaning they 
had lost in decades or centuries of re-applications and re-uses. 
Homer’s Wettkampf (1872) is one among Nietzsche’s first experimentations and 
improvisations with this idea; it is also a fierce denunciation of the anodyne and 
utilitarian study of antiquity that is typical of modern (and post-modern) scholarship 
(KSA 1.783-792). His main point is that the genuine ancient Greek worldview was 
progressively perverted by a crooked yet dominant version of philology. Today we have 
substituted the values of modern philanthropy and ‘humanism’ (Humanität), he says, 
for the Greek primeval and extra-moral quality of ‘being human’ (das Menschliche). 
‘Humanism’ not only sidestepped ‘being human,’ but reversed its value from positive to 
negative: thus, ‘humanism’ constantly undermines words and ideas that the Greeks 
approved as presuppositions of any contest for superiority (ἅμιλλα), such as  ἔρις (strife), 
ἔχθρα (enmity), and even envy (φθόνος). An unnatural and hypocritical moralising was 
substituted for the original significance of these words. 
Nietzsche’s point is both philologically and philosophically defensible. Take for 
example the application of the word aretê in the Platonic context. The term is 
commonly rendered by 'virtue' as if its significance was reduced to the realm of moral 
conduct. In reality, the meaning of Plato's aretê is much closer to excellence, and the 
individual struggle for differentiation and distinction. From a more philosophical 
viewpoint, consider the following example: these days we cherish the moral virtue of 
restraining our passions. We are addicted to a culture of moderation. One is 
instinctively taken aback by disputation and quarrel. Nobody approves of contentious 
persons, and we often claim a moral advantage in being more ‘moderate’ than others. 
Strife, then, acquires a negative value, just as we saw with egoism.  We thus hardly 
acknowledge that a generalized state of moderation in all things and thoughts is in 
itself profoundly immoderate, in fact, a very stark form of violence—the violence of 
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uniformity or non-distinction: a strifeless existence has no potential or future. For their 
part, the Greeks appreciated that neither philosophy, politics, nor art are at all possible 
with one accord; rather, variance and struggle are a proprium of becoming who you are, 
and struggle (Wettkampf) presupposes strife. In Homer’s Wettkampf, Nietzsche is in the 
same vein as Heraclitus: all things happen according to strife (DK 22Β8: πάντα κατ’ ἔριν 
γίνεσθαι). In all things the slightest movement amounts to a disentanglement from the 
present, and hence is in a certain tension or strife with the present. It is strife, then, 
that rapidly moves the world forward as well as individual human beings, at the same 
time that strife holds them together. By contrast, we now experience a world that is not 
at all the heir of the ancient one; rather it is its complete reversal: 
 
There is nothing the modern man fears more in an artist than the individual impetus of 
his struggle; contrariwise, the Greeks acknowledged the artist only as carrier of his 
personal struggle.  (KSA 1.790.19-21)  
 
Bereft of strife, the individual human being is trapped in a fine-spun pseudo-
community that early on makes of man a caricature of Achilles in the parable of Zeno of 
Elea: the dumbfounded Achilles cannot reach the tortoise because his every step opens 
up a new abyss before his feet. Similarly, I stare at an abyss whenever I contemplate the 
attempt to take a real step forward—for too long have I remained trapped in those 
presumably safe conceptual havens, wrapped up tightly in multiple layers of concepts, 
and have overslept in their nets. How then to walk on my own towards what is “more 
near and tangible”? Nietzsche and Heraclitus sound in accord once more: they are 
attracted by proximity and feel trapped in what is abstract. The things of which there is 
sight, hearing, experience, I prefer (DK 22B55: ὅσσων ὄψις ἀκοὴ μάθησις, ταῦτα ἐγὼ 
προτιμέω). The reason that the individual in antiquity enjoyed more freedom than 
today, says Nietzsche in Homer’s Wettkampf, is that his goals were closer and more 
tangible (KSA 1.790.4-5: näher und greifbarer).  
Nietzsche and Heraclitus are ἀγχιβάται: they ever come near and approximate to 
what is (DK 22B122: ἀγχιβασίην Ἡράκλειτος). Coming near or approximating to reality 
presupposes one's distance from appearances—ἀγχιβασία is allowed only by performing 
a previous breach with a conceptual and linguistic cloud that is too flexible and 
malleable to be anything at all. Mutatis mutandis, every single existence that really 
comes close in the Heraclitean sense is openly or covertly contentious, and therefore 
truly worthy of love.  
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Παλιντροπία 
The real struggle is neither with others, nor with the State or a world that is crooked or 
even inverted (verkehrte Welt); rather, it is a struggle with one’s own self: those who live 
life most beautifully are those who defy it, Nietzsche says in On the Pathos of Truth, or, as 
Zarathustra puts it in the culmination of his quest to achieve communication: man is 
something that must be overcome (KSA 4.332.16). The identity of every single human 
being is held together by his constant effort to override the self. Strife is an affirmation 
of the self.   
We have reached the crux of the matter. Both Heraclitus and Nietzsche see identity 
in difference, and harmony in variance (DK 22B8: Ἐκ τῶν διαφερόντων καλλίστην 
ἁρμονίαν). Men do not understand, says Heraclitus, that a thing may be at odds with its 
own self and only for this reason agree with itself—this is the pattern of harmony 
turning about (παλίντροπος ἀρμονία) found, for example, in the vibrating bow or lyre, 
whence harmony rests upon tension and extension (DK 22Β51).  
Existence is as παλίντροπος as a bow. Against all efforts of logic and theology to tie 
existence to a consistent paradigm of cause and consequence, existence in its full 
extension and potential cannot but contradict itself. Existence remains permanently at 
odds with itself: each instance disappears into the next like a snake devouring its tail 
and forever digesting itself. With those two little words: es war (that was), writes 
Nietzsche in 1873, “begins the struggle, all the pain, and life is inaugurated as a never-
ending Imperfectum” that oscillates between past and present (KSA 7.677.27-34).  
The name of the bow is Life (βίος), but its work is death (τῷ οὖν τόξῳ ὄνομα βίος, ἔργον 
δὲ θάνατος, DK 22Β48), says Heraclitus. The phenomenon of palintropia eventually finds 
its way within the actual words I employ to describe that phenomenon—or is it that 
palintropia is co-natural with the actual vibe of words?  For the word βιός in Homer 
stands for the bow, but it may equally be taken to refer to βίος, that is, the particular 
mode of life or manner of living (LSJ s.v. βίος Ι). Like all Being, words are palintropic.  
I am a wave in Nietzsche’s “necessary game of waves that is becoming” (KSA 
2.396.9-10). The likeness between the words wave (Welle) and will (Wille) underscores 
their shared tendency to consume and expend, as well as be expendable:  
 
Will and Wave.— How greedily this wave approaches, as if it were after something! How 
it crawls with terrifying haste into the inmost nooks of this labyrinthine cliff! It seems 
that it is trying to anticipate someone; it seems that something of value, high value, 
must be hidden there.—And now it comes back, a little more slowly but still white with 
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excitement; is it disappointed? Has it found what it looked for? Does it pretend to be 
disappointed?—But already another wave is approaching, still more greedily and 
savagely than the first, and its soul, too, seems to be full of secrets and the lust to dig up 
treasures. (KSA 3.546.7-17)  
 
What is the goal of that restless and yet melancholic undertow of existence? Towards 
what heights of fascination and despair is Nietzsche striving when running over the 
waves? I swim in the highest wave, he says in a note from 1881 (KSA 9.602.13). To what 
end? There is no goal at all. Thus live waves—thus live we who will (die Wollenden)—more 
I shall not say. The flux goes on and on through the mesh of language, science, morality, 
theology, and history. The turning about of things is ceaseless; it always manages to 
shake off all ephemeral attempts at utilitarian appropriation or valorization on behalf 
of culture or politics. I can only affirm with all my might and will the abyssal and 
flowing share of existence. The alternative would be to turn a blind eye to it and expend 
my life forever in its shadow. 
Replete with life, the on-going game of palintropia resists intellectual abstractions. 
It is impossible to translate the undulation of being into organized discourse, or 
distribute its meaning by means of linguistic vehicles. Human consciousness, says 
Nietzsche, developed out of the urge to communicate. And yet everything that surfaces 
in consciousness, hence everything that is communicable or “assumes the form of 
words, namely signs of communication,” in which he counts gestures or eye 
movements, is the product of an incomplete translation.  I am inescapably trapped in a 
vicious circle of communicating only what is not absolutely or properly mine (das 
Nicht-Individuelle), hence what is ultimately alien to the deeper core of myself:  
 
Fundamentally, all our actions are altogether incomparably personal, unique, and 
infinitely individual; there is no doubt of that. But as soon as we translate them into 
consciousness they no longer seem to be. (KSA 3.592.33-593.2) 
 
This thought is a Trojan horse. No philosopher putting trust in words and grammar 
should allow it in—for then I shall be at a loss, incapable of getting a grip on things or 
myself. For how am I even to speak about a self that is minimal and individual to such a 
degree that it might be damaged by even my slightest attempt at relation and 
comprehension, metaphor or translation? My innermost being is also the most fragile. 
The attempt to render the constant turning about of the self communicable ends in a 
language game and despair. The endeavor ultimately fails: it is impossible to bottle the 
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ego’s undertow, let alone turn its drive into a manipulatable source of energy for the 
benefit and pleasure of others. 
This is the first consequence of assuming a Heraclitean worldview: palintropic flux 
surpasses human sense perception as well as cognition, and hence aborts the attempt at 
establishing an adaequatio intellectus et rei. Neither Heraclitus nor Nietzsche allow for 
any absolute epistemic point of reference authorizing the safe and rigid distinction 
between phenomena and reality. What philosophers conveniently call ‘phenomena’ 
span categories and logical tools and exemplify a remarkable tenacity and resilience—
with the effect that ‘phenomena’ remain things in the view of all philosophy, theology, 
or morality. And yet elsewhere Heraclitus and Nietzsche somehow assume a clear 
distinction between the discourse of the Ephesians and a presumably hidden truth 
which is precisely that which causes Heraclitus and Nietzsche to differ and deviate 
from the “many” (hoi polloi). How are the two positions at all compatible?  The paradox 
reminds us of Socrates: the man who knew nothing and yet somehow knew that aretê 
was knowledge and that it was not to be found among hoi polloi. The only way to solve 
the paradox is to assume with Plotinus that “certainly that which is altogether without 
a share in the good would not ever seek the good” (Enn. III.5-45-6: οὐ γὰρ δὴ τὸ πάμπαν 
ἄμοιρον τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἄν ποτε ζητήσειεν). The very drive to become who I am 
presupposes a pre-reflective grasp of what it is that I am.  
Heraclitean flux, then, does not imply relativism. On the contrary, it calls for dark 
yet firm knowledge. Wisdom is one thing: to know the will that steers all things through all 
(DK 22Β41: εἶναι γὰρ ἓν τὸ σοφόν, ἐπίστασθαι γνώμην, ὁτέη ἐκυβέρνησε πάντα διὰ 
πάντων). The Greek word γνώμη does not here stand for one’s belief or judgement, 
rather for will, disposition, inclination (LSJ s.v. γνώμη ΙΙ).6 The Nietzschean will to 
power is a version of the Heraclitean γνώμη/will, which neither discloses nor conceals 
meaning, but is naturally manifested like a child’s play. Life [or: eternity] is a child at 
play, moving pieces in a game: the kingdom is a child’s (DK 22B52: αἰὼν παῖς ἐστι παίζων, 
πεσσεύων). Nietzsche’s/Zarathustra’s vision is one of humanity becoming child-like 
again (KSA 2.143.4: Die Menschheit zu verkindlichen), not in any naïve and agreeable 
sense of the word child, but insofar as childhood resides beyond civilization—it is extra-
moral and raw. 
 
Nietzsche, Cratylus, and fire 
The philosopher Cratylus, who belongs to the company “of those claiming to 
Heraclitise” (τῶν φασκόντων ἡρακλειτίζειν), as Aristotle has it, developed the “most 
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extreme version” (ἀκροτάτη δόξα) of the idea “that the whole of nature was in motion”: 
apparently Cratylus concluded that he was incapable of expressing any thought at all in 
speech, and confined himself to pointing with his finger. (TEGP 167 = Arist. Metaph. 
1010A7-15). Is the extreme consequence of surrendering myself to becoming Cratylus' 
speechlessness—or his absurdity? 
In the second Untimely Meditation Nietzsche deals with Cratylus, albeit without 
expressly naming him. He does not see in Cratylus’s case anything resembling a wise 
man or Zen master, but a man so helplessly immersed in the present, that is, addicted 
to “feeling historically,” that he is eventually rendered a mere plaything of becoming. 
Cratylus appears to have lost the safety-net of forgetfulness. Without forgetfulness, says 
Nietzsche, I hardly possess any means of protecting myself against my full exposure to 
being-in-history. It is lêthê then, the ability to forget, that allows me to endure my 
being in history, just as sleep allows me to repair my body and mind: “a man who 
wanted to feel historically through and through would be one forcibly deprived of 
sleep.” To be unable to forget is to collapse into a state of numbness:   
 
Imagine the most extreme example possible of a man who did not possess the power of 
forgetting at all and who was thus condemned to see everywhere a state of becoming: 
such a man would no longer believe in his own being, would no longer believe in 
himself, would see everything flowing asunder in moving points and would lose himself 
in this stream of becoming: like a pupil of Heraclitus, he would in the end hardly dare to 
raise his finger. (KSA 1.250.14-22) 
 
Often I feel deprived of sleep; and I despair over the Heraclitean view of things. I am 
taken over by a very Hellenic pessimism and to no avail do I struggle to forget. Today 
turns into a torrent consuming everything in a ceaseless flux of baseness and 
abjectness. Indiscriminately, words, actions, and things add up like the building blocks 
of an abominable tower of Babel, waiting for the angel of history to redeem them—that 
is, if they are at all worthy of redemption. Being in history is my sinking into a grim, 
glutinous, and marshy ground.  
Is forgetfulness my sole weapon against the Cratylus disease? In On the Pathos of 
Truth, Nietzsche indirectly suggests a complementary course of action, which he 
elaborates in the second Untimely Meditation. His remedy relies on the doctrine that life 
is realized instantaneously—rather than progressively, teleologically, or historically. 
There is no ‘end’ or goal of history; only moments that are indeed final, insofar as in 
them the world appears perfected. These moments are short-lived and scattered, yet 
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ferocious, excessive, and fully accomplished. The temporal distance between these 
instantaneous moments may appear as great as the solitude of their individual carriers: 
for it is these men who the instantaneous moments connect, individual human beings 
who appear to have been as ephemeral as anything else within the flow of history, yet 
they manifested what Nietzsche calls Genius.  
My only priority is to safeguard my kinship with these instantaneous moments—to 
maintain the possibility of my mooring to them with sympathetic ties that span the 
continuum of history. Paragraph 314 of Daybreak contains a very good formulation of 
this idea—and exemplifies some very Heraclitean points of reference: 
 
In the midst of the ocean of becoming we awake on a little island no bigger than a boat, 
we adventurers and birds of passage, and look around us for a few moments: as sharply 
and as inquisitively as possible, for how soon may a wind not blow us away or a wave not 
sweep across the little island, so that nothing more is left of us! But here, on this little 
space, we find other birds of passage and hear of others still who have been here 
before—and thus we live a precarious minute of knowing and divining, amid joyful 
beating of wings and chirping with one another, and in spirit we adventure out over the 
ocean, no less proud than the ocean itself. (KSA 3.227.3-14) 
 
We have already witnessed Nietzsche riding the waves; but now he is surrounded by 
waves: restricted to a small island that will not itself stay there for long, he strives to 
experience a precious moment spanning past, present, and future. The strained relation 
to waves exemplifies the opposed or palintropic tropes of existence. Affirming both, I 
stay who I am and at the same time I become who I am—thus forever and inescapably 
full of strife and disquietude.    
In the meantime, I observe how the clerical and political flocks, as well as their 
shepherds, repeatedly fail to meet the current circumstances—they do whatever occurs to 
them  (Crito 44d). The louder they fail, the clearer I hear Nietzsche’s call for a passage 
from the communal view of history to my individual engagement with the stars without 
an atmosphere. I feel the urge to trigger past moments of splendor: the Hindu legislator 
Manu, Heraclitus, Homer, Pindar, Thucydides, Napoleon, Schopenhauer, Goethe, R.W. 
Emerson are Nietzsche’s brief signals to the real ridge of history. There might be others; 
yet here is Nietzsche’s message for dire times: kinship with fully experienced moments 
of the past cures the malady of history and relieves its ephemeral texture. Only my 
individual self may open those gates that the State and all sorts of failed communities 
have so long ago shut in my face: “Whatever in nature and in history is of my own kind 
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speaks to me, spurs me on, and comforts me; the rest I do not hear or forget right away” 
(KSA 3.498.25-8).  
The normal flow of history, it seems, hinders the ordinary flow of life. I need to exit 
the river of history in order to enter the river of life.  Only in the company of my own 
self do I realize that I am with someone else. Who is that? 
Thousands of years, says Nietzsche, may instantaneously become meaningful 
owing to the appearance of a single human being. The fulfilment of an individual 
existence justifies the passing by of armies of “fragmentary men” (KSA 11.24-8: 
Bruchstück-Menschen). This is Heraclitus’s point: εἷς ἐμοὶ μύριοι, ἐὰν ἄριστος ἦι: one man 
is worth ten thousand to me, if he is superior (DK 22Β49). Only in the modern context 
does Nietzsche’s Heraclitean aristocratism give me cause for concern: for he argues that 
human beings are not in themselves carriers of dignity (Würde), but only insofar as they 
successfully exemplify Genius. This is the full reversal of Kant’s moral philosophy. 
Nietzsche appears to see men as means towards an end (KSA 1.776.4-8)—the means for 
retrieving the inner-self that they themselves have frittered away.  
In this vein Nietzsche re-invigorates modern philosophy with a quality appropriate 
to Heraclitus’s hylozoistic worldview and alien to modern moral philosophy: interval 
fluctuation. Heraclitus’s first principle is “an ever-living fire, kindling in measures and 
being quenched in measures” (DK 22Β30: πῦρ ἀείζωον, ἁπτόμενον μέτρα καὶ 
ἀποσβεννύμενον μέτρα). Nietzsche’s Genius is an intellectual and spiritual fire, 
increasing and decreasing according to the fluctuations of history. The constant 
alteration of Genius implies my ability to shift from the passive, linear, and 
homogeneous perception of history to an interventionist and energetic relation to the 
highest moments of what was arbitrarily labelled ‘the past.’ After all, this is the latent 
meaning of Nietzsche’s appropriation of the tenet of Heraclitean metaphorical 
language—fire:  
 
Yes, I know from where I came! 
Ever hungry like a flame, 
I consume myself and glow. 
Light grows all that I conceive, 
Ashes everything I leave: 
Flame I am assuredly 
(KSA 3.367.15-20)  
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To read Heraclitus alongside Nietzsche is to participate in a fiery constellation of 
minds that seemingly are asphyxiated within community and yet invite me to breathe 
in their thoughts. When I do so, I am genuinely surprised. The more inward I turn, the 
less alone I become. Gustav Landauer is the Nietzschean philosopher who best 
understood this paradox, resolving it in terms of a movement from separation to 
community: the more inward I turn, the less alone I am (durch Absonderung our 
Gemeinschaft). In Landauer’s words: “since the world has disintegrated into pieces and 
has become alienated from itself, we have to flee into mystic seclusion in order to 
become one with it again.”7  This is one of Nietzsche’s messages, and, as it happens, this 
is Heraclitus’s message too. Self-exemption from community is seemingly an anti-
political move; in reality, it is a presupposition for establishing a genuine connection 
with what lies beyond today. Solitude leads the way to communion. But in contrast with 
Christian asceticism, the Heraclitean and Nietzschean anchorite does not find 
consolation in any personal godhead; he remains forever unassimilable and alien to the 
dominant discourse of mainstream religion and politics.  
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[Editor’s note: The original Greek version of this essay appeared in the September 2015 issue of 
The Athens Review of Books.] 
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